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Citizenship, Co-ethnic Populations and Employment 
Probabilities of Immigrants in Sweden 
 
Over the last decades, Sweden has liberalized its citizenship policy by reducing the required 
number of years of residency to five for foreign citizens and only two for Nordic citizens. Dual 
citizenship has been allowed since 2001. During the same period, immigration patterns by 
country of birth changed substantially, with an increasing number of immigrants arriving from 
non-western countries. Furthermore, immigrants were settling in larger cities as opposed to 
smaller towns as was the case before. Interestingly, the employment integration of 
immigrants has declined gradually, and in 2006 the employment rate for foreign-born 
individuals is substantially lower compared to the native-born. The aim of this paper is to 
explore the link between citizenship and employment probabilities for immigrants in Sweden, 
controlling for a range of demographic, human capital, and municipal characteristics such as 
city and co-ethnic population size. The information we employ for this analysis consists of 
register data on the whole population of Sweden held by Statistics Sweden for the year 2006. 
The basic register, STATIV, includes demographic, socio-economic and immigrant specific 
information. In this paper we used instrumental variable regression to examine the “clean” 
impact of citizenship acquisition and the size of the co-immigrant population on the probability 
of being employed. In contrast to Scott (2008), we find that citizenship acquisition has a 
positive impact for a number of immigrant groups. This is particularly the case for non- 
EU/non-North American immigrants. In terms of intake class, refugees appear to experience 
substantial gains from citizenship acquisition (this is not, however, the case for immigrants 
entering as family class). We find that the impact of the co-immigrant population is 
particularly important for immigrants from Asia and Africa. These are also the countries that 
have the lowest employment rate. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decades, Sweden has liberalized its citizenship policy by reducing 
the required number of years of residency to five for foreign citizens and only two for 
Nordic citizens. Dual citizenship has been allowed since 2001. During the same period, 
immigration patterns by country of birth changed substantially, with an increasing 
number of immigrants arriving from non-western countries. Furthermore, immigrants 
were settling in larger cities as opposed to smaller towns as was the case before. 
Interestingly, the employment integration of immigrants has declined gradually, and in 
2006 the employment rate for foreign-born individuals is substantially lower compared to 
the native-born.  
In an era where there is increasing immigration and increasing diversity, and 
concomitantly a policy era where countries both within and outside Europe are seeking to 
tighten citizenship acquisition rules, it is important to understand the socio-economic 
outcomes associated with naturalization. Citizenship acquisition can be viewed as a 
measure of integration. On the flip side, interaction with co-ethnics, for better or worse, is 
often viewed as a measure of segregation. Theoretically then, where citizenship 
acquisition should be correlated with higher employment probabilities in the general 
labour market, interaction with co-ethnics is correlated with employment in the enclave 
economy.  
The aim of this paper is to explore the link between citizenship and employment 
probabilities for immigrants in Sweden, controlling for a range of demographic, human 
capital, and municipal characteristics such as city and co-ethnic population size.   
Specifically, we examine the degree to which citizenship acquisition effects employment 
outcomes, controlling for place of birth, personal characteristics, and the characteristics   4
of the city within which immigrants reside. We pay particular attention to the size of the 
co-immigrant population within a municipality and ask if the size of the community 
impacts employment opportunities.   
Using instrumental variable regressions to control for the impact of citizenship 
acquisition, we find that age, marital status, and educational level are important 
determinants of obtaining employment by foreign-born men and women. For immigrants 
from outside the EU and North America, we find that the size of the co-immigrant 
population in a city has a significant positive effect on the probability of being employed.  
In the same way, we find that the acquisition of citizenship makes a real difference to the 
probability of finding work.obtaining employment. Foreign-born men and women who 
acquired citizenship are far more likely to be employed than those who have not. The size 
of the co-ethnic population has a positive impact for many immigrant groups—as the co-
ethnic population increases, the probability of being employed also increases. It appears 
to be particularly important for immigrants from Asia and Africa, who are also the 
immigrants that face the lowest employment prospects. 
Immigration, Citizenship and Employment  
Immigration and employment integration  
Post-war immigration to Sweden came about in two waves. In the 1940s, 50s and 
60s, labour immigration from the Nordic and other European countries was a response to 
excess demand for labour due to the rapid industrial and economic growth of that time. 
Organized recruitment of foreign labour and a general liberalisation of immigration 
policy facilitated migratory moves to Sweden. The lower rate of economic growth and 
increased unemployment in the early 1970s diminished the demand for foreign labour. As   5
a consequence, migration policy became harsher (Castles and Miller 2003). Labour 
immigration from non-Nordic countries ceased in the 1970s while the number of labour 
immigrants from other Nordic countries decreased gradually. Since the early 1970s, 
refugees and tied-movers have dominated the migration inflow, coming primarily from 
Eastern Europe and non-European parts of the world. 
Labour migration to Sweden was primarily from the Nordic countries, but also 
from other Western European countries (1950s) and the Balkans (1960s) (Lundh and 
Ohlsson 1999). These labour migrants typically had no difficulties in finding employment 
and settling down in Sweden with their families. According to earlier studies (Wadensjö 
1973; Ohlsson 1975), foreign-born men and women had higher employment rates than 
natives in 1970. A gradual decrease in the employment rate of foreign-born men is 
noticeable from the 1970s and onwards. For foreign-born women, we see an increase in 
employment up to the middle of the 1980s, but this increase is not in parity with the 
increase in employment of native women. Both the native- and foreign-born were 
negatively affected by the economic crisis of the early 1990s, but the relative decline of 
the immigrant employment rate was larger. [AUTHOR: you could replace “natives and 
the foreign-born” throughout with “the native- and foreign-born” if you wish to avoid any 
confusion between “native-born” and indigenous peoples. You’d need to do a search 
through the entire paper for “native” if you decided on this option.] The employment gap 
between natives and the foreign-born has narrowed since the middle of the 1990s. The 
lower employment integration of immigrants who arrived in the 1970s caused the average 
immigrant employment rate to decrease in the 1990s and early 2000s (Bevelander 2000).    6
A snapshot of today’s employment integration by country of birth shows us that 
almost all foreign-born groups, and in particular newly arrived groups of refugees, have 
lower employment rates than natives. The general pattern is that natives have the highest 
employment rate, followed by Europeans and thereafter non-Europeans (Bevelander 
2009).  
Different studies have put forward explanations as to why the employment rate 
among immigrants in Sweden is lower than that for natives. In addition to educational 
level differences, language barriers, and economic restructuring, a larger influx of 
refugees than in earlier decades together with various types of discrimination are found to 
be partially responsible for the gap in employment rates between various groups of 
immigrants relative to natives.   
Ethnic Enclaves  
In the context of labour markets, cultural communities may be closely connected 
to labour market enclaves for three reasons (see Bonacich and Modell 1980; Wilson and 
Portes 1980). First, labour market enclaves may offer a degree of social comfort through 
language and shared identity that is not available outside the enclave. Second, ethnically 
defined enclaves may buffer the effects of ethnically based discrimination on the part of 
mainstream society. Third, Breton (1974) introduces the concept of “institutional 
completeness,” which in part describes the variety of services available within an ethnic 
or cultural enclave. Enclaves that are institutionally complete offer a wide variety of 
services and employment opportunities to group members. Large enclaves are more 
likely to be institutionally complete than small enclaves. We may then expect workers in 
large enclaves to earn more than workers in small enclaves because of the greater degree   7
of choice that exists. Pendakur and Pendakur (2002) assessed the labour market impact of 
three types of enclaves in Canada (ethnic, linguistic, and ethno-linguistic) and concluded 
that the size of the ethnic enclave is important in reducing earnings differentials across 
minority groups.   
Citizenship and employment  
Although political and research interest in the topic has grown in recent years, 
there is no overwhelming number of studies analyzing the socio-economic impacts of the 
citizenship ascension of immigrants. Internationally, it was Chiswick (1978) who did the 
first study tracing the economic performance of immigrants to the US, including 
consideration of whether immigrants had become US citizens or not. Initially this study 
finds a positive effect of naturalization on earnings. When including years since 
migration, however, this initial effect of citizenship acquisition becomes insignificant.  
Renewed interest in the socioeconomic effects of naturalization can be observed 
in both North America and several European countries. Bratsberg et al. (2002), 
employing both cross-sectional and longitudinal data for the US, shows a positive 
significant effect of naturalization on the earnings growth of immigrants, controlling for 
differences in unobserved individual characteristics. Using cross-sectional data, DeVoretz 
and Pivnenko (2006, 2008) show for Canada that naturalized immigrants had higher 
earnings and consequently made larger contributions to the Canadian federal treasury 
than their non-naturalized counterparts. Similarly, Akbari (2008) used cross-sectional 
data for the year 2000 in the US and found that naturalized immigrants have increased 
treasury payments as well as a higher rate of welfare participation.In addition, tax 
payments exceed transfer payments for naturalized immigrants after ten years of   8
residence in the US. Mazzolari (2007) found employment and earnings increased for 
naturalized Latin American immigrants to the US when their home countries passed dual 
citizenship laws and granted expatriates the right to naturalize in the receiving country.  
For Europe, Kogan (2003) analyzed the impact of naturalization policy on former 
Yugoslavian immigrants to Sweden and Austria and showed a positive effect of 
naturalization for Austria but not for Sweden, indicating that the institutional framework 
around citizenship is different in the two countries, consequently impacting  the effects of 
naturalization. Bevelander and Veenman (2006) analyzed the naturalization effect on 
Turkish and Moroccan immigrants to the Netherlands with cross-sectional survey data. 
The results of the multivariate analyses indicate that naturalization of Turks and 
Moroccans in the Netherlands is not positively related to cultural integration or to 
employment integration. In their 2008 study, Bevelander and Veenman analyze the effect 
of naturalization on refugee groups in the Netherlands and find naturalization to have a 
positive effect on the probability of obtaining employment. Moreover, this analysis 
indicates that so-called “naturalization classes” have no significant effect on the labour 
market participation of immigrants. For Norway, using longitudinal data, Hayfron (2008), 
shows that refugees in particular have higher earnings when naturalized relative to non-
naturalized immigrants and confirms that naturalization is positively related to economic 
integration. Similarly, in a study of Germany using panel data, Steinhardt (2008)  finds an 
immediate positive naturalization effect on wages as well as an accelerated wage growth 
in the years after the naturalization.  
Using 1990 census data for Sweden, Bevelander (2000) shows a log odds increase 
of obtaining employment for those naturalized compared to non-naturalized. Scott   9
(2008), however, using longitudinal data for a number of immigrant countries, found only 
small “naturalization” effects on income. Moreover, Scott’s study suggests that this 
citizenship effect is largely a selection effect and not a function of citizenship itself.  
Summarizing the literature on citizenship and economic integration, and in line 
with Bevelander and DeVoretz (2008), studies for the US and Canada seem to support 
the existence of a “citizenship premium” whereas European studies show only scattered 
support for this hypothesis. One reason for the difference in results may be the variance 
in data across countres. Another may be that citizenship effects could be mixed with 
other selection effects, as well as issues of participation.   
Citizenship in Sweden  
Citizenship in Sweden is based on the jus sanguinis principle. Even if they are 
born in Sweden, the children of non-Swedish citizens are not automatically entitled to 
Swedish citizenship. Naturalisation is possible after five years, and for refugees, after 
four years, of residence in Sweden. Citizens from other Nordic countries are exceptions 
to this rule and can obtain citizenship after two years of residence. In addition, the 
applicant has to be eighteen years of age or older and have no criminal record.
2 
Acquiring citizenship by notification is also possible. This is basically a simplified
juridical naturalisation procedure that is mainly used by Nordic citizens. For notificat
the applicant must meet the following requirements: eighteen years of age or older, five 
years of residence in Sweden, and no prison sentencing during this tim
 
ion, 
e.   
                                                
Citizenship legislation has been reformed over the past forty years, with respect to 
naturalisation, civil and political rights of citizens and non-citizens, as well as dual 
 
2 In this case, the applicant has a waiting period before he or she can apply for Swedish citizenship.   10
citizenship. These changes have also led to debates about the meaning of citizenship. 
Sweden has, perhaps, the most liberal naturalisation rules in Europe. The waiting period 
for citizenship was shortened in 1976, and the subsistence requirement,
3 which had been 
relaxed during the 1950s and 1960s, abolished, as was the language proficiency test. 
Despite a number of debates and proposals—most recently during the 2002 electoral 
campaign—about naturalisation requirements, including language proficiency, no 
changes to legislation or policy have been made. Compared to other European countries, 
the issue has been less debated in Sweden. 
Naturalisation rates vary among persons of different nationalities (Table 1). 
Whereas most people from south-eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa naturalise, 
fewer do so from the Nordic countries and north-western Europe, with the exception of 
Finland and Germany.  
The relation between residence and citizenship is also important. Most of the 
rights given to citizens are also granted to others residing in the country, with some 
exceptions such as the exclusive right to enter the country and voting rights in national 
elections. As well, legally speaking, it is easier to limit certain civil rights when it comes 
to foreigners. The citizenship requirement for several government positions has been 
relaxed over time and today only a few positions—including certain senior officials, 
judges and military personnel—are reserved for citizens.
4 
Following the increasing international emphasis on social equality, changes were 
made in the late 1960s to minimise the differences between citizens and non-citizens 
                                                 
3 The subsistence requirement relates to persons’ ability to support themselves in terms of work or other 
income. 
4  Obtaining a Swedish passport reduces barriers in certain jobs, such as those in the transport sector or 
cross-border service jobs.     11
regarding access to welfare arrangements and social rights. This near-equal status within 
these contexts has by and large remained the case. Occasionally, debates do take place, 
for instance about regulating labour migration from the new member states in the EU 
2004. Proponents of regulation argued that Swedish welfare systems are vulnerable to 
immigration because of the connection between residence and social rights. Their 
opponents maintained that Sweden has one of the strictest systems in Europe regarding 
access to social rights for irregular migrants. Adult irregular migrants have access only to 
emergency hospital care and the access to education for minors was not guaranteed for a 
long time. With increasing numbers of irregular migrants in Sweden, this has recently 
become a topic of intense debate. 
A central change during the mid 1970s was to grant voting rights in local and 
regional elections to permanently residing non-citizens. The bill was adopted 
unanimously by parliament in 1975 and applied for the first time in the 1976 election. At 
the time, there were high expectations that this would lead to extensive participation in 
elections, but as discussed below, voter turnout has actually dropped over the past thirty 
years. Extending non-citizens’ voting rights to national elections was discussed in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The Social Democrats and the Communists favoured this, arguing 
that voting rights should be tied to residence, whereas the Centre-Right parties argued 
against the proposal, maintaining that citizenship and voting rights are intrinsically tied 
together. 
The debate about voting rights affected the discussion of dual citizenship. An 
extensive de facto toleration of dual citizenship evolved in the late 1970s. Authorities 
exempted persons from renouncing their existing citizenship when becoming a Swedish   12
citizen in cases when it was impossible to renounce the existing citizenship, or very 
difficult and costly to do so. Despite some debates, no changes were made to dual 
citizenship legislation in the 80s. When the issue reappeared in the late 1990s, all parties 
except the Moderate Party came to accept that dual citizenship should be allowed and the 
legislation was changed in 2001.
5 
These changes to citizenship legislation and practice have involved debates about 
the meaning of citizenship. Opponents to the changes have often remarked that 
citizenship is devalued by these changes and that the active stance on the part of persons 
wanting to become citizens should be emphasised. The latter argument is found in the 
debates about national voting rights, dual citizenship, and in the recent discussions about 
naturalisation requirements. Proponents have placed weight on naturalisation’s positive 
effects for immigrants’ social, economic and political integration. That persons 
permanently residing in the country should have the opportunity to express their political 
views on matters of public concern has often been emphasised, as well as the more recent 
argument that in today’s globalised world, people feel at home in several places, and this 
does not weaken their ties to any one place. Opponents have stressed that notwithstanding 
such changes, it is of central importance that persons make a choice about the political 
community to which they belong. 
Data, method and model  
Our data are drawn from the 2006 Swedish register through STATIV, the 
statistical integration database held by Statistics Sweden. These data contain information 
                                                 
5 The Centre-Right parties, which had opposed dual citizenship in the 80s, changed their position in the 
90s, partly due to the de facto toleration, and partly because of an increasing focus on Swedish citizens 
wanting to become citizens in other countries while retaining their bonds with Sweden.   13
for every legal Swedish resident, including age, sex, marital status, children in the 
household, educational level, employment status, country of birth, years since migration,
6 
and citizenship status. The sample we employ in the analysis is the population aged 25-
64. The lower-age boundary was chosen mainly because of the presumption that 
individuals older than 24 have finished their studies and are likely to be active in the 
labour market. The upper-age demarcation was chosen because many individuals leave 
the labour market at this age.  
We limit our sample to immigrants who have the potential to be active in the 
labour force. This is true for all Nordic and EU-25 immigrants on entry. However, nearly 
all non-Nordic/non-EU immigrants spend the first few years of residence in settlement 
training courses and therefore have limited possibilities to acquire gainful employment.
7 
For this reason, we only include non-Nordic/non-EU immigrants who have been resident 
in Sweden for at least two years.   
Our study has two main goals. First we wish to understand how citizenship 
acquisition may be a factor in attaining employment. Second we wish to understand the 
degree to which the presence of an ethnic enclave may contribute to patterns of 
employment across different immigrant groups. In order to do so, we run two types of 
regressions. First we run normal OLS regressions for all immigrants who are eligible to 
work where the dependent variable is whether or not the respondent is employed.  Second 
we “instrument” citizenship and run a similar set of regressions as well as a set of 
regressions that break out place of birth and immigrant intake class. In IV regressions 
                                                 
6 Since Statistics Sweden has no individual information on year of immigration before 1968, we exclude 
immigrants arriving before that date from the analysis.  
7  This is largely true for immigrants from North America as well, and we therefore treat these immigrants 
as eligible for employment on entry.    14
focussed on place of birth, we include a variable that describes the size of the co-ethnic 
population. In this way we can see the impact of the size of the ethnic enclave in a given 
city on the employment prospects of co-ethnic members. In both sets of regressions, we 
include contextual information on the municipality of residence.   
We understand both citizenship acquisition and working to be a form of 
participation in the larger society. Within this context, the impact of citizenship may be 
interpreted two ways: Citizenship acquisition may be a sign of commitment to Sweden, in 
that immigrants who acquire citizenship may be signalling their intentions to remain and 
participate in Swedish society; and,within the context of employment, citizenship 
acquisition may act as a signal to employers that the prospective employee is committed 
to remaining in Sweden and is thus a better “risk.”  We instrument citizenship because we 
believe that citizenship acquisition is wrapped up with a host of other participatory 
factors, including whether or not a person is employed. If this is the case, people who get 
a job are also likely to become citizens. In order to remove the bias caused by both 
actions being forms of participation, we use citizenship acquisition rules and the years 
since first eligibility for citizenship as an instrument for citizenship.  The rules are as 
follows:  
1.  Immigrants from Nordic countries who have lived in Sweden for two 
or more years are eligible for citizenship.  For Nordic immigrants, the 
number of years in Sweden after two years of residence is assumed to 
be the number of years he or she has been eligible for citizenship.   15
2.  Immigrants from other countries are eligible to apply for citizenship 
after five years. The number of years after this is considered to be the 
number of years he or she has been eligible for citizenship. 
By “instrumenting” citizenship in this way, we interpret the coefficient for citizenship as 
the “clean” effect of citizenship on employment possibilities (without the impact of 
participation that is correlated with getting a job).  
We run a similar set of regressions by intake class.  This allows us to examine the 
degree to which citizenship acquisition may differentially impact family and refugee 
classes of intake. We also run separate instrumental variable regressions for each of the 
ninecountries of birth groups. This is equivalent to a model in which all variables are 
interacted with country of birth. Within these regressions, we include a variable that 
identifies the number of people in the municipality who share place of birth with the 
respondent.  
We include fourteen variable types in our models. Contextual variables, drawn 
from the registry, include the log of the city population, the log of the immigrant 
population, and the local unemployment rate for the city labour market area. In order to 
define the size of the enclave population, we aggregated immigrant place of birth data 
from the Swedish registry to a municipal level and then merged this new dataset with our 
individual level dataset.   
Demographic variables include age (four dummy variables), marital status (four 
dummy variables), presence of children in the household (four dummy variables), and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the spouse is Swedish.     16
Socio-economic variables include schooling (five dummy variables) and 
schooling interacted with whether the last level of schooling was outside Sweden (for a 
total of ten dummy variables).  For regressions with all immigrants, we include country 




Table 2 provides information on the percent of men and women who are 
employed by country of birth and citizenship status.  The most important thing to note in 
this table is the substantial variance in employment probabilities across groups and 
citizenship. Over four-fifths of Swedish-born men and women are employed. Looking 
first at citizens, we see that amongst female immigrants, the employment rate ranges 
from a high of 72 percent for East Asian women to a low of 48 percent for women from 
the Middle East. For women who are not Swedish citizens, the employment rates are 
considerably lower for most groups compared to their co-ethnics who are citizens. 
Among men with citizenship, over 70 percent of those from the Nordic countries, East 
Asia, and the Americas are employed.  Around 70 percent of immigrant citizens from the 
EU and the rest of Europe as well men from South Asia are employed. However, for 
other groups, that proportion drops to about 60 percent.  As was the case for women, men 
who are citizens are more likely to be employed than their co-ethnic non-citizens. 
Our examination of some fairly basic descriptives suggests that citizenship 
acquisition is correlated with higher employment integration in the Swedish labour 
                                                 
8  We use the EU 25 definition for our EU (non-Nordic category).    17
market. Our question is whether citizenship still has this impact when controlling for 
other variables and whether the size of the enclave acts to increase the employment rate. 
Regressions  
OLS Regression Results:  
Table 3 shows results from two regressions (split by sex) where the dependent 
variable is whether the respondent is employed.  In this table, the sample only includes 
immigrants. Looking first at the contextual variables, for both men and women, we can 
see that as city size increases, the probability of being employed decreases. However, as 
the number of immigrants and the employment rate in a city increases, the probability of 
having a job increases.  
Looking at personal characteristics, we see that women age 35-44 are more likely 
to be employed than younger or older women. As compared to being single or married, 
being separated or widowed results in lower probabilities of being employed (coefficients 
range from -0.02 to -0.04) but having a Swedish spouse is correlated with higher 
probabilities of having a job (0.07). Generally, higher levels of schooling are correlated 
with higher probabilities of being employed. Indeed, coefficients for being in the upper 
level of schooling are over twice that of being in the lower level (0.31 compared to 0.15).  
The place of schooling variable identifies whether a respondent obtained the last level of 
schooling from outside Sweden. It is insignificant, but interacting place of schooling with 
level of schooling has a small negative impact (ranging from no significant impact for 
lower secondary to -0.03 for upper university).   
As compared to immigrants from Nordic countries, women from all other 
countries have lower probabilities of employment with coefficients ranging from -0.07   18
for women from Latin America to -0.23 for women from the Middle East. The impact of 
citizenship acquisition is not terrible strong (0.06).  
Looking at men, we see that aging is correlated with lower probabilities of being 
employed. Men who are married have a higher probability of being employed than other 
marital status categories (single, divorced or separated). The impact of Swedish schooling 
is somewhat weaker for men as compared to women, with coefficients ranging from 0.10 
at the low end of the education spectrum to 0.21 at the upper end. However the impact of 
foreign schooling is different. Obtaining schooling from outside Sweden results in 
slightly higher probabilities of being employed. For example, obtaining a lower 
secondary or a university certificate from outside Sweden results in a coefficient of +0.03 
(0.05 obtaining the last level of schooling outside Sweden plus -0.02 for having a lower 
secondary or university certificate).   
As was seen for women, compared to immigrant men from Nordic countries, men 
from other countries all have lower probabilities of employment. However, it should be 
noted that the effects tend to be lower than those seen for women. As compared to 
immigrants from Nordic countries, men from the EU are slightly less likely to be 
employed (coefficient of -0.02). The coefficient for men from the Middle East is -0.16.   
For both men and women, years since migration and citizenship status are 
important determinants of employment. The coefficient for years since migration is 0.02 
for women and 0.01 for men.    
IV Regressions: (H3) 
Table 4 shows results that are similar in spirit to those seen in Table 3. However 
the regression results from this table instrument citizenship to be a product of eligibility   19
and years since being eligible. This allows us to examine the degree to which effects 
attributed to socio-economic characteristics (in Table 3) are actually a product of 
citizenship acquisition.   
Comparing coefficients across the two tables, we see that the impacts of city 
characteristics are basically the same. This is also true for the socio-demographic 
characteristics (age, marital status, presence of children and schooling).   
The coefficients for our “clean” version of citizenship is 0.42 for women and 0.22 
for men, suggesting that citizenship has a very strong impact on the probability of getting 
a job. Further, there are important differences that become evident by considering place 
of birth.  [AUTHOR: please make sure this conveys your intended meaning. Reword as 
needed.]Instrumenting citizenship dramatically increases the negative impact of being 
born outside the Nordic countries. For example, amongst women, instrumenting 
citizenship often doubles the negative impact of being an immigrant—in Table 3, for 
instance, the coefficient for women born in the EU is -0.08, while in Table 4 it is -0.16.  
For women from the Middle East, the coefficient is -0.23 in Table 3 and -0.43 in Table 4.  
Among men, the impact of instrumenting citizenship is strong but not quite as stark. The 
coefficient for men from the Middle East is -0.16 in Table 3 and -0.23 in Table 4.   
Differences by Class:  
Table 5 shows partial regression results from regressions modelling the 
probability of being employed for all immigrants, family class and refugee class 
immigrants. Results for all immigrants are shown for ease of comparison since they are 
also available in Table 3. The key point to draw from Table 4 is that  citizenship is far 
more important for independent and refugee class immigrant women than for family class   20
immigrant women. The citizenship coefficient for family class women is insignificant 
while it is positive and strong for all immigrants and refugees (0.42 and 0.16 
respectively). For men the differences are starker. The coefficient for family class males 
is -0.20 while for other immigrants it is strong and positive. This suggests that family 
class immigrants are not coming to Sweden for purposes of work, and that therefore 
citizenship acquisition does not have a significant impact.  
Differences by country of birth: 
Tables 3 and 4 provide a bird’s eye view of the impact different characteristics 
have on the probability of employment. These tables allow us to understand the average 
degree to which the probability of employment differs across immigrant groups.  
However, they do not allow for the possibility that payoffs for different characteristics are 
different across immigrant groups. Results from Table 4, for example, do not allow us to 
see if Nordic women have a very different payoff to schooling as compared to women 
from the Middle East.  Further, results at this level do not allow us to measure the impact 
of the co-ethnic population because all immigrant groups are rolled into the “log of 
immigrant population” variable. Table 6 resolves this situation by providing selected 
coefficients from a total of eighteen separate regressions—a separate regression for each 
place of birth by gender group. The dependent variable remains employment status and 
independent variables include all the variables from Table 3. Thus we allow each of the 
coefficients to vary independently for each place of birth group (equivalent to results 
from Table 3, but where each characteristic is interacted with place of birth).  
Regression results shown in Table 6 include one additional independent variable. 
For each respondent we have added the log of the number of immigrants from the same   21
group who live in their city. Thus, for example, in the case of a Nordic immigrant from 
Malmo, “the Log of immigrant population” variable corresponds to the log of the number 
of Nordic immigrants living in the Malmo.   
As can be seen in Table 6, with the exception of immigrants from Nordic 
countries and North America, a larger immigrant population is correlated with lower 
probabilities of employment (ranging from -0.01 to -0.05 for every log unit increase in a 
municipality’s immigrant population). The coefficients for the log of the co-immigrant 
group size, however, move in the opposite direction. With the exception of women from 
Nordic countries, the coefficients are positive and range from 0.01 to 0.03 for every log 
unit increase in the municipality’s co-immigrant population. The impact of the co-
immigrant population is often stronger for men than for women. For example, for 
immigrants from the Middle East or Asia, the coefficient for the log of the co-immigrant 
population is 0.01 for women and 0.02 for men. This suggests that having a large co-
ethnic population may be effective in increasing employment prospects for its members. 
With the exception of immigrants from Nordic countries and men from the EU 25, the 
impact of acquiring citizenship is uniformly positive and strong for all immigrant groups, 
ranging from 0.19 to 0.46 for women and 0.15 to 0.20 for men. The highest impact of 
citizenship is found for immigrants from Europe outside the EU and the Nordic countries 
(0.46 for women and 0.20 for men).  We note that the effect is often stronger for women 
than it is for men. For example, for women from Africa, the coefficient for citizenship is 
0.27, while for men it is 0.17.    22
Conclusion  
The latter half of the twentieth century saw a liberalization in immigrant intake 
and citizenship acquisition regulations in many immigrant receiving countries.  More 
recently, countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, and the USA 
have tightened up citizenship and immigrant intake regulations and have witnessed 
declines in the employment probabilities for immigrants. In contrast, Sweden has 
continued to liberalize citizenship acquisition regulations, most recently recognizing dual 
citizenship (2001), while at the same time seeing declining employment prospects for 
immigrants. Several scholars have argued that there is a link between citizenship 
acquisition and employment status (i.e., Devoretz and Pivenko [2008] in regards to 
Canada;  Akbari [2008] in studies of the US; and Steinhardt [2008] and Hayfron [2008] 
in European studies).  These studies, however, are hampered by their inability to 
distinguish the effect of citizenship from the effect of integration processes (i.e., they 
cannot say whether the measured impact is a product of citizenship or some correlate of 
citizenship such as better integration).   
In this paper, we used instrumental variable regression to examine the “clean” 
impact of citizenship acquisition and the size of the co-immigrant population on the 
probability of being employed. In contrast to Scott (2008), we find that citizenship 
acquisition has a positive impact for a number of immigrant groups. This is particularly 
the case for non-EU/non-North American immigrants. In terms of intake class, refugees 
appear to experience substantial gains from citizenship acquisition (this is not, however, 
the case for immigrants entering as family class).     23
The size of the co-ethnic population has a positive impact for many immigrant 
groups—as the co-ethnic population increases, the probability of being employed also 
increases. It appears to be particularly important for immigrants from Asia and Africa, 
immigrant groups who also face the lowest employment prospects. For these immigrants, 
the co-immigrant population may serve as an employer of last resort, buffering the impact 
of possible discrimination by the majority population. It could also be an indicator of a 
lack of linguistic integration, which effectively locks immigrants out of the majority 
labour force (see, for example, Pendakur and Pendakur 2002).   
So, in a country where the barriers to non-citizens are relatively few (i.e., non-
citizens have access to most of the jobs and most of the rights of citizens, both social and 
legal), why might citizenship help in employment prospects?  Spence (1973) argues that 
observable characteristics act as signals to employers about the potential risk of hiring 
new employees. Within this context, citizenship may act as a signal to employers about 
an immigrant’s commitment to remaining in Sweden. Hiring a citizen thus reduces 
transaction and risk costs to employers because they can be more certain that the new 
employee will remain in the position.   
Looking at citizenship and employment from a policy perspective, what are the 
implications of tightening up citizenship acquisition requirements?  Our contention is that 
given citizenship’s apparent link  to improved employment prospects, tightening up 
citizenship regulations may result in decreased employment opportunities for immigrants 
in receiving countries. This means, in turn, that stricter citizenship regulations could have 
the effect of actually increasing social welfare costs—an effect neither intended nor 
desirable.   24
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Citizenship acquisition in Sweden 
by country of birth, 2006Table 2
% Employed by Group, Sex and Citizenship
Place of Birth Non-citizens Citizens Non-citizens Citizens
Swedish 81% 81%
Nordic 68% 71% 60% 74%
EU25 53% 67% 63% 69%
Rest of Europe 37% 62% 47% 71%
N. America 44% 72% 54% 75%
Latin America 44% 68% 57% 73%
Africa 21% 59% 32% 64%
Middle East 13% 48% 26% 61%
S. Asia 25% 61% 31% 68%
E. Asia 37% 72% 37% 73%






Model Summary Observations 345,494  323,991  
R2 0.13 0.11
City Characteristics Log of city size -0.03 0.00 *** -0.03 0.00 ***
Log of immigrant pop 0.02 0.00 *** 0.02 0.00 ***
% employed in city 1.02 0.03 *** 1.45 0.04 ***
Age (25-34) 35-44 0.05 0.00 *** -0.02 0.00 ***
45-54 0.01 0.00 *** -0.08 0.00 ***
55-64 -0.14 0.00 *** -0.22 0.00 ***
Marital status (single) Married 0.01 0.00 *** 0.07 0.00 ***
Divorced/Separated -0.02 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00
Widowed -0.04 0.01 *** -0.01 0.01
Partner is Swedish 0.07 0.00 *** 0.07 0.00 ***
Presence of children (none) 1 child 0.04 0.00 *** 0.10 0.00 ***
2 children 0.04 0.00 *** 0.13 0.00 ***
3+ children -0.04 0.00 *** 0.07 0.00 ***
Schooling (< secondary) Lower secondary 0.15 0.01 *** 0.10 0.01 ***
Upper secondary 0.22 0.01 *** 0.18 0.01 ***
Lower university 0.20 0.01 *** 0.15 0.01 ***
Upper university 0.31 0.01 *** 0.21 0.01 ***
Last level outside Sweden 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 ***
Lower secondary 0.01 0.01 * -0.02 0.01 ***
Upper secondary -0.03 0.01 *** -0.05 0.01 ***
Lower university -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 ***
Upper university -0.03 0.01 *** -0.02 0.01 ***
Country of birth (Nordic) EU not Nordic -0.08 0.00 *** -0.02 0.00 ***
Rest of Europe -0.08 0.00 *** -0.05 0.00 ***
N. America -0.10 0.01 *** -0.06 0.01 ***
Latin Amer -0.07 0.00 *** -0.02 0.00 ***
Africa -0.12 0.00 *** -0.13 0.00 ***
Middle East -0.23 0.00 *** -0.16 0.00 ***
S. Asia -0.16 0.00 *** -0.12 0.00 ***
E. Asia -0.04 0.00 *** -0.07 0.01 ***
Migration characteristics Years since migrating 0.018 0.00 *** 0.012 0.00 ***
Yrs since mig sq 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
Citizenship (Swedish) 0.06 0.00 *** 0.08 0.00 ***
Significance:  *: 0.1; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01






Model Summary Observations 345,494    323,991   
R2 0.05 0.10
City Characteristics Log of city size -0.03 0.00 *** -0.03 0.00 ***
Log of immigrant pop 0.02 0.00 *** 0.02 0.00 ***
% employed in city 1.00 0.04 *** 1.44 0.04 ***
Age (25-34) 35-44 0.04 0.00 *** -0.02 0.00 ***
45-54 0.01 0.00 ** -0.08 0.00 ***
55-64 -0.14 0.00 *** -0.22 0.00 ***
Marital status (single) Married -0.02 0.00 *** 0.06 0.00 ***
Divorced/Separated -0.05 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *
Widowed -0.07 0.01 *** -0.02 0.01 *
Partner is Swedish 0.08 0.00 *** 0.08 0.00 ***
Presence of children (none) 1 child 0.04 0.00 *** 0.10 0.00 ***
2 children 0.04 0.00 *** 0.12 0.00 ***
3+ children -0.05 0.00 *** 0.06 0.00 ***
Schooling (< secondary) Lower secondary 0.15 0.01 *** 0.11 0.01 ***
Upper secondary 0.22 0.01 *** 0.18 0.01 ***
Lower university 0.21 0.01 *** 0.14 0.01 ***
Upper university 0.32 0.01 *** 0.21 0.01 ***
Last level outside Sweden 0.05 0.01 *** 0.08 0.01 ***
Lower secondary 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 ***
Upper secondary -0.04 0.01 *** -0.06 0.01 ***
Lower university -0.02 0.01 ** -0.03 0.01 ***
Upper university -0.03 0.01 *** -0.03 0.01 ***
Country of birth (Nordic) EU not Nordic -0.16 0.00 *** -0.03 0.00 ***
Rest of Europe -0.26 0.01 *** -0.12 0.01 ***
N. America -0.19 0.01 *** -0.08 0.01 ***
Latin Amer -0.22 0.01 *** -0.06 0.01 ***
Africa -0.29 0.01 *** -0.18 0.01 ***
Middle East -0.43 0.01 *** -0.23 0.01 ***
S. Asia -0.30 0.01 *** -0.16 0.01 ***
E. Asia -0.19 0.01 *** -0.12 0.01 ***
Migration characteristics Years since migrating 0.01 0.00 *** 0.01 0.00 ***
Yrs since mig sq 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
Citizen (instrumented) 0.42 0.01 *** 0.22 0.01 ***
Significance:  *: 0.1; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01
females malesgroup variable Coef. Robust S.E. sig Coef. Robust S.E. sig
all immigrants Observations 345,494 323,991
R2 0.05 0.10
Log of city size -0.03 0.00 *** -0.03 0.00 ***
Log of immigrant pop 0.02 0.00 *** 0.02 0.00 ***
% employed in city 1.00 0.04 *** 1.44 0.04 ***
Citizen (instrumented) 0.42 0.01 *** 0.22 0.01 ***
Family Observations 99,335 58,133
R2 0.14 0.02
Log of city size -0.04 0.00 *** -0.05 0.01 ***
Log of immigrant pop 0.03 0.00 *** 0.04 0.00 ***
% employed in city 1.20 0.07 *** 1.56 0.10 ***
Citizen (instrumented) -0.02 0.04 -0.20 0.06 ***
Refugees Observations 59,009 84,700
R2 0.17 0.14
Log of city size -0.02 0.01 *** -0.05 0.01 ***
Log of immigrant pop 0.01 0.00 * 0.03 0.00 ***
% employed in city 0.83 0.08 *** 1.24 0.07 ***
Citizen (instrumented) 0.16 0.03 *** 0.15 0.03 ***
Note:
Significance:  *: 0.1; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01
Other variables included in the regression are: age, marital status, place of birth of 
spouse, presence of children, schooling, and schooling interacted with place of 
schooling 
Table 5: Partial results from 6 Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions on being 
employed
females malesgroup variable Coef. Robust S.E. sig Coef. Robust S.E. sig
Nordic Observations 88,082 70,435
R2 0.00 0.00
Log of city size 0.007 0.013 0.033 0.010 ***
Log of immigrant pop -0.035 0.012 *** -0.048 0.010 ***
% employed in city 1.836 0.214 *** 2.071 0.153 ***
ln group size -0.003 0.004 0.017 0.003 ***
Citizen (instrumented) -2.899 0.319 *** -1.923 0.234 ***
EU 25 Observations 58,211 55,695
R2 0.00 0.04
Log of city size 0.012 0.007 * -0.017 0.007 **
Log of immigrant pop -0.026 0.006 *** -0.003 0.006
% employed in city 1.195 0.095 *** 1.079 0.097 ***
ln group size 0.011 0.002 *** 0.006 0.002 ***
Citizen (instrumented) 0.505 0.043 *** -0.271 0.071 ***
Rest of Europe Observations 57,777 51,963
R2 0.08 0.14
Log of city size -0.008 0.007 -0.003 0.007
Log of immigrant pop -0.010 0.006 -0.018 0.006 ***
% employed in city 0.525 0.079 *** 0.985 0.074 ***
ln group size 0.005 0.002 ** 0.007 0.002 ***
Citizen (instrumented) 0.456 0.021 *** 0.198 0.022 ***
N. America Observations 7,739 9,218
R2 0.10 0.12
Log of city size -0.001 0.017 -0.009 0.015
Log of immigrant pop -0.005 0.015 0.003 0.013
% employed in city 0.613 0.272 ** 1.040 0.251 ***
ln group size 0.011 0.004 *** 0.008 0.004 **
Citizen (instrumented) 0.275 0.081 *** 0.154 0.069 **
Latin Amer. Observations 18,723 17,713
R2 0.01 0.07
Log of city size -0.012 0.012 -0.029 0.011 **
Log of immigrant pop -0.002 0.011 0.015 0.010
% employed in city 0.954 0.190 *** 1.119 0.178 ***
ln group size 0.019 0.003 *** 0.008 0.003 ***
Citizen (instrumented) 0.434 0.067 *** 0.067 0.087
Africa Observations 18,260 23,271
R2 0.12 0.11
Log of city size 0.031 0.014 ** 0.011 0.012
Log of immigrant pop -0.055 0.013 *** -0.033 0.011 ***
% employed in city 1.074 0.222 *** 1.123 0.200 ***
ln group size 0.027 0.003 *** 0.023 0.003 ***
Citizen (instrumented) 0.269 0.048 *** 0.173 0.069 **
Table 6: Partial results from 18 Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions on being 
employed
females malesgroup variable Coef. Robust S.E. sig Coef. Robust S.E. sig
Table 6: Partial results from 18 Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions on being 
employed
females males
Middle East Observations 58,554 72,940
R2 0.16 0.11
Log of city size 0.02 0.01 *** -0.02 0.01 ***
Log of immigrant pop -0.040 0.007 *** -0.008 0.006
% employed in city 0.920 0.111 *** 1.358 0.102 ***
ln group size 0.022 0.002 *** 0.016 0.002 ***
Citizen (instrumented) 0.142 0.017 *** 0.137 0.022 ***
S. Asia Observations 15,426 14,578
R2 0.07 0.09
Log of city size 0.006 0.013 -0.037 0.013 ***
Log of immigrant pop -0.016 0.011 0.008 0.012
% employed in city 1.574 0.195 *** 1.180 0.199 ***
ln group size 0.018 0.003 *** 0.020 0.003 ***
Citizen (instrumented) 0.446 0.071 *** 0.289 0.071 ***
E. Asia Observations 22,721 8,147
R2 0.00 0.11
Log of city size 0.011 0.010 -0.042 0.017 **
Log of immigrant pop -0.021 0.009 ** 0.029 0.015 *
% employed in city 1.453 0.150 *** 1.482 0.218 ***
ln group size 0.025 0.003 *** 0.012 0.005 **
Citizen (instrumented) 0.479 0.056 *** 0.175 0.112
Note:
Significance:  *: 0.1; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01
Other variables included in the regression are: age, marital status, place of birth of 
spouse, presence of children, schooling, and schooling interacted with place of 
schooling Appendix Table 1: Test of Model
Showing t test
Instrument
group variable females males females males
All immigrants Eligible for citizenship 107.92 91.15 115.67 88.22
Years since eligible 8.9 33.36
Nordic Eligible for citizenship -4.87 -4.01 -9.65 -9.47
Years since eligible 4.53 5.67
EU 25 Eligible for citizenship 26.66 16.79 27.53 11.05
Years since eligible 3.75 16.17
Rest of EuropeEligible for citizenship 54.95 47.26 53.6 46.72
Years since eligible 16.03 14.67
N. America Eligible for citizenship 12.4 13.87 11.46 11.44
Years since eligible 5.57 9.02
Latin Amer. Eligible for citizenship 14.45 8.86 16.07 10.21
Years since eligible -4.26 -5.45
Africa Eligible for citizenship 15.96 13.3 20.17 14.86
Years since eligible -9.67 -2.43
Middle East Eligible for citizenship 55.6 49.19 62.31 50.21
Years since eligible -18.04 -4.46
S. Asia Eligible for citizenship 12.38 14.55 14.77 15.05
Years since eligible -2.62 1.22
E. Asia Eligible for citizenship 12.72 9.99 19.04 9.68
Years since eligible -7.82 2.58
Refugees Eligible for citizenship 26.43 27.49 30.82 0
Years since eligible -1.45 -5.92
Family Eligible for citizenship 27.71 17.69 27.02 18.19
Years since eligible -9.25 2.26
Eligible for Citizenship and 
Years since Eligible
Eligible for citizenship only